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Optimal dimensionality for quantum cryptography
D.B.Horoshko∗ and S.Ya.Kilin
Institute of Physics, Belarus National Academy of Sciences, F.Skarina Ave. 68, Minsk 220072 Belarus
We perform a comparison of two protocols for generating a cryptographic key composed from
d-valued symbols: one exploiting a string of independent qubits and another one utilizing d-level
systems prepared in states belonging to d+1 mutually unbiased bases. We show that the protocol
based on qubits is optimal for quantum cryptography, since it provides higher security and higher
key generation rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
Quantum cryptography is a technology allowing two
distant parties to share a random string of symbols (cryp-
tographic key) in such a way that any eavesdropping from
the third party will cause a detectable disturbance. This
can be achieved by using for communication quantum
systems in states highly sensitive to measurement. Since
its discovery by Bennett and Brassard (BB84 protocol)
[1], quantum cryptography plays a central role in the
field of quantum information processing [2], being the
most experimentally advanced application in this field
and serving as a ’testing ground’ for new ideas [3]. In par-
ticular, recently it has been shown that the exploiting of
quantum systems of dimension higher than two (qudits)
results in higher disturbance cost of information, making
the protocol tougher to eavesdrop [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. This
situation differs dramatically from that of classical infor-
mation, where the length of the alphabet does not play
any role, and therefore the most simple binary encoding
is commonly used [9].
However, the comparison between qubit and qudit pro-
tocols seems to us to be incomplete, since the qudit en-
coding is not compared to the case where a dit (d-valued
symbol) is encoded in a sequence of independent qubits.
Indeed, to share a key composed from dits (for simplic-
ity we consider d = 2n) the communicating parties can
use the standard binary cryptographic protocol with the
corresponding mapping of classical data, e.g. a four-
valued symbol (quart) can be decomposed into two bits,
an eight-valued symbol - in three bits et cetera.
In the present paper our aim is to consider the protocol
for distributing a 2n-letter cryptographic key by means
of 6-state protocol for qubits [10, 11] and to compare it
to the protocol utilizing 2n-level quantum systems with
states chosen from mutually unbiased bases [4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Our comparison will be significant for two practical prob-
lems. On one hand, if one has two-level systems, such as
single photons with different polarizations, one can com-
pose a 2n-level system from a sequence of n qubits, but
the access to any state in the Hilbert space of such a
system will require entanglement between the qubits, i.e.
an additional quantum resource. Our analysis will show,
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how much one gains with respect to security and the key
generation rate in exchange to this resource. On the other
hand, if one has a 2n-level system, one can represent its
Hilbert space as a direct product of n two-dimensional
systems, and use it for standard cryptography based on
qubits, restricting oneself to factorizing states of n sub-
systems. Our analysis should show if this strategy yields
any benefice.
Let us first recall the details and notations of the 6-
state extension of BB84 protocol for quantum cryptogra-
phy [10, 11]. In this protocol the sender (Alice) generates
a random bit and encodes it in a state of a qubit, choos-
ing randomly one of three possible bases. The first basis
is denoted as |0〉 and |1〉. The other two are
|0′〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) , |1′〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) , (1)
and
|0′′〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉) , |1′′〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i |1〉) .
(2)
The qubit is sent to the receiver (Bob), who measures it
in a randomly chosen basis. This procedure is repeated
many times. After the public disclosure of bases, cho-
sen by Alice and Bob, both parties keep only those bits
for which the bases coincide. In this way Alice and Bob
generate a shared random string of bits. A part of this
string can be communicated via public channel to deter-
mine Bob’s disturbance - the percentage of incorrectly
received bits. On the basis of the measured disturbance a
standard procedure of privacy amplification is performed
in order to decrease the information of possible eaves-
dropper [12]. As a result, a secure shared cryptographic
key is generated.
The same protocol can be used for generating a cryp-
tographic key composed from 2n-valued symbols. Alice
generates a random string of symbols, writes each sym-
bol in binary and communicates with Bob as described
above. After the binary key is generated, each n succes-
sive bits are mapped back into 2n-valued symbols. Now
we need to consider how this protocol is affected by inter-
vention of an eavesdropper (Eve). We restrict ourselves
to individual attacks, for which at most one qubit at a
time is attacked.
2Eve can exploit different strategies for individual
eavesdropping, e.g., the simple intercept-resend strategy,
where she intercepts a qubit, measures it in a random
basis and resends to Bob a qubit, prepared in the mea-
sured state. In this way Eve gains some information in
exchange to disturbance introduced into Bob’s key. In or-
der not to be detected, Eve is interested in increasing her
information and decreasing the Bob’s disturbance. The
best known at present strategy for that end is the asym-
metric cloning of qubit [6, 7, 8]. In this type of attack
Eve attaches to the Alice’s qubit two additional qubits
denoted E and M , performers a unitary transformation
of all three qubits, and sends the first qubit further to
Bob, keeping the other two. After the disclosure of bases
used by Alice and Bob, Eve measures her two qubits in
the basis chosen by Alice. The cloning transformation,
written in ”correct” basis, is [6]:
|ψk〉A −→ |ψk〉B
(
α√
2
(|0〉E |0〉M + |1〉E |1〉M ) (3)
+
β√
2
|ψk〉E |ψk〉M
)
+
β√
2
|ψk+1〉B |ψk〉E |ψk+1〉M
where the two states of the basis are denoted as |ψ0〉 = |0〉
and |ψ1〉 = |1〉, and the summation in index is taken mod-
ulo 2. The real positive numbers α and β are parameters
of the cloning machine, they satisfy the relation
α2 + αβ + β2 = 1. (4)
The first term in the r.h.s. of Eq. (3) corresponds
to Bob having no error, while the second term corre-
sponds to a flip of Bob’s qubit. After the measurement
of her qubits Eve accepts the value of the measurement
of qubit E as the corresponding bit in the eavesdropped
key. There are three possible outcomes of measurements
by Eve and Bob of the state described by Eq. (3): (i)
Eve and Bob receive correct values of Alice’s bit with
probability p0 = (α+ β)
2 /2; (ii) Bob receives the correct
value, but Eve receives the incorrect one with probability
pe = α
2/2; and, finally, (iii) Bob receives the incorrect
value, while Eve receives the correct one with probability
pb = β
2/2. Bob in no way can guess which of the cases
takes place (without revealing his bit to Alice). In the
meanwhile, Eve can distinguish first two cases from the
third one by comparing the outcomes of measurements
of her two qubits E and M . Let us denote the difference
(modulo 2) of these outcomes as m. If the outcomes co-
incide (m = 0), then the first or the second case occurs,
if they differ (m = 1), then the third one takes place.
Given m = 0 Eve’s probability to get the correct value is
q = p0/(p0 + pe). On the basis of these probabilities one
can calculate information got by Bob and Eve. We per-
form this calculation for keys composed from 2n-valued
symbols.
First we consider the case of n = 2. In this case two
qubits are used for sending a 4-valued symbol (quart).
Eve clones each qubit separately, measures her qubits in
correct basis and keeps the values of E qubits for her
key. Besides she calculates differences of outcomes of
measuring her qubits E and M - m1 for the first qubit
and m2 for the second one. Four possible cases should
be distinguished depending on the values of m1 and m2.
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that the value
00 was sent by Alice. Then the four cases are as follows.
For m1 = m2 = 0, which happens with probability
ξ00 = (p0+pe)
2, the distribution of Eve’s quart is P
(00)
E =
(q2, q(1 − q), q(1 − q), (1 − q)2), while that of Bob’s one
is P
(00)
B = (1, 0, 0, 0). Here we write the distribution in
the vector form (p00, p01, p10, p11), where pij denotes the
probability for quart to have value ij in binary notation.
Similarly, form1 = 0, m2 = 1 (first bit being the major
one), which happens with probability ξ01 = pb(p0 + pe),
we have P
(01)
E = (q, 0, 1− q, 0), P (01)B = (0, 1, 0, 0).
For m1 = 1, m2 = 0, which happens with probability
ξ10 = pb(p0+pe), we have P
(10)
E = (q, 1− q, 0, 0), P (10)B =
(0, 0, 1, 0).
And, finally, for m1 = m2 = 1, which happens with
probability ξ11 = p
2
b , we have P
(10)
E = (1, 0, 0, 0), P
(10)
B =
(0, 0, 0, 1).
Now we are ready to calculate the information on Al-
ice’s quart received by Bob and Eve. This information is
calculated as I = 2−H(P ), where H(P ) is the Shannon
entropy function calculated for the distribution P :
H(P ) = −
∑
i,j=0,1
pij log2 pij . (5)
However, averaging over m1 and m2 is performed dif-
ferently for Bob and Eve. Bob does not know the
values of m1 and m2, and therefore for him the aver-
age distribution 〈PB〉 =
∑
ξijP
(ij)
B is found first, and
then the information for this distribution is calculated
IB = 2−H(〈PB〉). Eve, on the contrary, knows the val-
ues of m1 and m2 and her information is calculated for
each case and then averaged: IE = 2− 〈H(PE)〉. In this
way we obtain
〈PB〉 =
(
(1− pb)2, pb(1 − pb), pb(1− pb), p2b
)
, (6)
IB = 2− 2h(pb), (7)
IE = 2− 2h(q)(1 − pb), (8)
where h(q) ≡ −q log2 q− (1−q) log2(1−q). Informations
of Bob and Eve are exactly twice that for the case of bits,
as could be expected. If one considers the dependence of
IB and IE from pb (note that q can be expressed through
pe, using Eq. (4)), one finds that IB decreases with pb
while IE increases. The intersection of two curves defines
the border value of pb, below which Bob’s information
exceeds Eve’s one and therefore the standard procedure
of privacy amplification if applicable. This value is the
solution of equation
2− 2h(pb) = 2− 2h(q)(1− pb), (9)
3and is the same as for the 6-state protocol for quantum
cryptography with qubits, pb = 0.1564. In the case of
generating binary key pb has the sense of disturbance,
i.e. probability for Bob to get incorrect symbol in his
key. In the case of cryptography with quarts, considered
here, the intersection of two curves occurs at the same
value of pb, but the border disturbance is now D˜
(4) =
1−(1−pb)2 = 0.2883. The growth of disturbance reflects
the fact that an incorrect quart can be received when only
one bit is wrong and another one is correct. This point
was mentioned in Ref. [11], but did not deserve a detailed
consideration up to now.
The considered cryptographic protocol for generating a
key consisting from quarts can be compared to the proto-
col where 5 mutually unbiased bases in four-dimensional
Hilbert space are used [6, 7, 8]. In the latter protocol
Alice and Bob use for encoding such bases that the over-
lap of two any states from different bases is the same.
The rest of the protocol resembles BB84. The use of mu-
tually unbiased bases guarantees that no information on
the encoded symbol is got if an incorrect basis is chosen
for measurement. Therefore the protocol implementing
such bases should provide the best security for cryptogra-
phy with qudits. The analysis of eavesdropping by means
of asymmetric cloning of qudits shows that in this case
[6, 7]
〈PB〉 = (1−D,D/3, D/3, D/3) , (10)
IB = 2 + (1−D) log2(1−D) +D log2
D
3
, (11)
IE = 2 + (1−D)(1 − µ) log2(1− µ) (12)
+(1−D)µ log2
µ
3
,
where µ = DE/(1 − D), D and DE being Bob’s and
Eve’s disturbances respectively, connected by the follow-
ing parametric relations: DE = 3α¯
2/4, D = 3β¯2/4,
where α¯ and β¯ are real positive parameters of the cloning
machine for four-level quantum systems, satisfying the
normalization relation
α¯2 +
1
2
α¯β¯ + β¯2 = 1. (13)
The solution of equation IB = IE in this case gives the
result D(4) = 0.2666. We see that D(4) < D˜(4), that
is the cryptographic protocol exploiting qubit pairs for
generating a key of quarts is more secure against eaves-
dropping attacks, than the protocol, utilizing four-level
systems prepared in one of 5 mutually unbiased bases.
Besides, the former protocol provides higher key genera-
tion rate, since 1/3 of systems is used for the key, against
1/5 in the latter case.
This result is easily generalized to any value of n. If a
sequence of n qubits is used for generating a key of 2n-
valued symbols, then Bob’s disturbance corresponding to
intersection of informational curves for Bob and Eve is
D˜(2
n) = 1 − (1 − 0.1564)n. The corresponding distur-
bance D(2
n) for the case where 2n-dimensional systems
are used, being prepared in a state chosen from 2n + 1
mutually unbiased bases, is calculated as a solution of
equation IB = IE where [6, 7]
IB = n+ (1−D) log2(1−D) +D log2
D
2n − 1 , (14)
IE = n+ (1−D)(1 − µ) log2(1− µ) (15)
+(1−D)µ log2
µ
(2n − 1) ,
where again µ = DE/(1 −D), but this time D and DE
are connected by equations DE = (1 − 2−n)α˜2, D =
(1− 2−n)β˜2, where
α˜2 +
1
2n−1
α˜β˜ + β˜2 = 1. (16)
The both disturbances D˜(2
n) and D(2
n), calculated nu-
merically, are plotted in Fig.1 as functions of n. The plot
shows, that D˜(2
n) is always greater than D(2
n), i.e. a
protocol based on qubits is more secure than that based
on qudits. Note that for symbols with more than two
values the disturbance is not limited by 1/2.
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FIG. 1: The border disturbance for sharing a key composed
from 2n-valued symbols, using qubits (crosses) and 2n-level
systems (circles).
One could conjecture that a sequence of qubits encod-
ing one quart could be effectively eavesdropped by a col-
lective attack. But this is not so, since any collective at-
tack produces correlation between attacked qubits, and
therefore can be easily detected by Bob. Undetectable
collective attack should address randomly chosen qubits,
i.e. it may to be expected to be equally successful for
qubits and qudits. Moreover, it is still unclear at present,
if collective attacks are more effective than individual
ones [3].
We conclude that the optimal dimensionality for quan-
tum cryptography is 2, i.e. two-dimensional systems are
the best tool for information encoding, like in the classical
information theory. This result leads us to two practical
4recommendations concerning implementation of quan-
tum cryptography. First, if one has two-level systems
available for quantum cryptography, there is no sense in
entangling them for producing systems of higher dimen-
sions. Second, if one has multilevel systems at hand, it is
more profitable to decompose the states of each system
into direct product of two-dimensional spaces and use
them for standard cryptographic protocol with qubits.
This strategy provides better security and better key gen-
eration rate.
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